






























































































































































The e®ect ofgreater sorting into communities, workplaces, schools and households
is becominga topicofconcernin many countries. Wilson(1987) and Reich(1991),
for example, have worried that increased segregation at the community level or in
the creation of new \gated communities" will lead to increased inequality in the
US. In Europe, observers worry that the geographic and social marginalization
of recent immigrants may lead to increased social tensions. In the UK, the
strati¯cation of the social system and the existence of a self-perpetuating social
and educational elite is a perennial topic of debate.
There is some evidence, at least in the US, that there is increased sorting in
almost all these spheres. Jargowsky (1996), for example, shows that sorting by
income at the neighborhood level appears to have increased across all groups in
USmetropolitan areas even after controlling for racial and ethnic group character-
istics. This appears to be particularly true for Blacks and Hispanics, leading to
the fear that lower-income individuals in these groups will be left without positive
peer e®ects provided by a more integrated middle class. Kremer and Maskin
(1996) present some evidence that sorting by skill level in the workplace has in-
creased and Mare (1991) shows that the probability that a high school graduate
will marry a college graduate has decreased.
This paper is concerned with the e®ect of increased segregation on marital
sorting, inequality and welfare. We present a model of marital sorting in which
both environment (the degree of segregation) and preferences (the tradeo® indi-
viduals make between the quality of a match and the consumption they would
enjoy) determine the degree of assortative matching. In the model, individuals
are either skilled or unskilled (according to education decisions made when young)
and have a given number of opportunities in which to form a household with an-
other agent. The probability of an individual meeting a skilled or an unskilled
individual depends on the degree of segregation in society. Whether a household
is formed or not depends on an individual's future matching opportunities, on
the quality of the match, and on the household income an individual would en-
joy. Couples have children and these in turn decide whether to become skilled or
unskilled workers. A decision to become skilled (synonymous here for acquiring
a given level of education) is costly, both in terms of resources and in terms of
e®ort. To ¯nance education, young individuals borrow in an imperfect capital
market in which parental income plays the role of collateral. Thus parental in-
come and the child's e®ort cost (the distribution of which is allowed to di®er by
1family type), determine the proportion of children from each family type that in
aggregate become skilled. These individuals then also meet and form households,
have children, and so on.
We show that the steady state to which this economy converges will in general
depend upon initial conditions. In particular, it is possible to have steady states
with a high degree of sorting (skilled agents form households predominantly with
others who are skilled; unskilled form households predominantly with unskilled)
and high inequality Alternatively, there can be steady states with a low degree
of sorting and low inequality.
We then examine the theoretical e®ects of an increase in segregation on the
steady-state of the economy. We show that this depends not only on the pro¯le
of fertility and the propensity for children to become skilled (as in Fern¶ andez
and Rogerson (forthcoming)), but also on the degree to which this increase in
segregation a®ects the expected utility di®erential between skilled and unskilled
individuals and how this translates into a change in the relative supply of skilled
individuals.
Next we examine the e®ects of an increase in segregation by parameterizing
the steady state of the model to several key UK statistics. We use primarily the
British Cohort Study to create a sample of parents andchildren that permits us to
examine the degree of correlation of parents in education and the probability that
a child from di®erent parental types will become skilled. This, alongwith data on
fertility by parental type, the skill premium, and the elasticity of substitution in
production, allows us to ¯nd the steady-state proportion of skilled individuals in
the economy. We next proceedto examine the e®ects ofan increase in segregation
¯rst in a model in which all behavior (i.e., matching and the skill supply by each
family type) is exogenously speci¯ed. This allows us to compare our results with
those of Fern¶ andez and Rogerson for the US. We then add endogenous matching
to the parameterized model and lastly we allow for endogenous relative supply of
factors as well. We ¯nd that the e®ects of increased segregation depends on the
speci¯cation of the model. Skilled workers are always made better o®; the fate of
unskilledworkers depends onthe size ofthe supply response. Inall cases, however,
an increase in segregationleads to increased inequality of expected utility between
skilled and unskilled workers. From an ex ante utility point of view, however, we
¯nd that increased segregation increases welfare inthe fully endogenous calibrated
model.
The literature most closely related to this paper is Kremer (1997), Fern¶ andez
and Rogerson (forthcoming), and Fern¶ andez, Guner and Knowles (2001). The
2¯rst two papers examine the consequences of greater marital sorting on long-run
inequality. Kremer (1997) uses a linear model of intergenerational transmission
of education to argue that even a large increase in marital sorting is unlikely to
have important quantitative consequences for the distribution of income in the US
in the long run. Fern¶ andez and Rogerson argue the opposite by showing that the
intergenerational transmission process is likely to be non-linear. They show that
once fertility di®erentials and the (non-linear) propensity of children from di®er-
ent family types to become more educated are taken into account, an increase in
marital sorting would be likely to have a signi¯cant quantitative impact on the US
income distribution. Lastly, Fern¶ andez et al.(2001) provide a model of marital
sorting, fertility and inequality that generates multiple steady states with greater
inequality leading to more assortative matching and greater fertility di®erentials
among high and low income families. Using a cross-section of 35 countries, they
show that couples are more correlated in their years of education the greater the
skill premium and that countries with more sorting have lower per capita income,
as predicted by the model. There is also a small literature on endogenous match-
ing but that basically abstracts from the endogeneity of the income distribution
in the economy (e.g., Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (1992), and Burdett and
Coles (1997, 1999)). Aiyagari, Greenwood, and Guner (2000) and Greenwood,
Guner and Knowles (200) also examine marriage decisions, but they are primarily
concerned with fertility and divorced decisions (which our model does not ad-
dress) and use a computational approach to solve complicated individual decision
problems.
In addition to the literature on marital sorting, there is also a rapidly growing
literature that is concerned with various aspects of sorting in other spheres (see
Fern¶ andez (forthcoming) for a recent review of this literature). Alesina and
La Ferrara (2000) examine the consequences of heterogeneity of communities for
the formation of social capital. Using survey data on group membership in US
localities, they ¯nd that participation in social activities is signi¯cantly lower in
more diverse (racially or ethnically) and more unequal communities. Bisin and
Verdier (2000) provide a model of intergenerational transmission of ethnic and
religious traits. They ¯nd that an increase in segregation increases the fraction
of assortative marriages. Fern¶ andez and Rogerson (1996) use a multi-community
model to show that a local system of ¯nancing education is likely to lead to
suboptimal sortingofincome groups, withtoo fewhigher-incomeindividuals living
in poorer communities. There is alsoa large literature that examines thee®ects of
borrowing constraints on human capital accumulation. The most relevant papers
3here are by Benabou (1996), Cooper (1997), Durlauf (1995), and Fern¶ andez and
Rogerson (1997,1998) as they concernedwith the e®ects ofsorting or strati¯cation
(into neighborhoods and schools) for the transmission of education and growth in
the presence of borrowing constraints.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section sets up the model.
Section3 is devoted toa theoretical analysis ofthe e®ects of increasedsegregation.
Section 4 parameterizes the steady state of the model to UK statistics. Section
5 examines the reaction of the parameterized model to an increase in segregation.
Section 6 concludes.
2. The Model
We consider a two period OLG model with the following timing of decisions.
In the ¯rst period of life, young individuals decide whether to become one of
two types{skilled or unskilled{with each type synonymous with the individual
acquiring a given amount of education. Having made the education decision, the
individual enters a \household matching market" and acquires a mate. In the
second period the individual works, pays o® debt associated with the education
decision of the ¯rst period (if any), consumes and has children.
To simplify our model we take a couple's fertility as exogenous and, as will
be seen shortly, we also abstract from bargaining problems within a family by
assuming that the couple shares a joint household utility function over consump-
tion. Thus, in the second period of life families simply consume their household
income I minus whatever debt repayment they need to make. All the interest-
ing economic action in the model concerns how individuals decide with whom to
match given their skill type and how they decide upon a skill type in the ¯rst
place. We next turn to a discussion of the matching decision.
2.1. Segregation and Household Matching
Our model of household sorting (or matching) is simple and yet allows both en-
vironment (how segregated schools and neighborhoods are) and preferences (how
individuals trade o® income and quality of relationship) to matter. Individuals
are assumed to have two rounds in which to ¯nd a match. The opportunities
available in an individual's ¯rst round depend on the individual's environment.
The opportunities available in the second round depend on the individual's skill
type.
4In the ¯rst round individuals are more or less segregated according to the in-
dividual's exogenously speci¯ed environment. There they meet someone and can
decide whether to match with that person. If they decide not to match with that
person they then enter the second round of matching. In this round, a skilled
individual will be matched with another skilled individual, whereas unskilled in-
dividuals get matched with other unskilled individuals. This two-step process (as
in Fern¶ andez, Guner and Knowles (2001)) is meant to re°ect that, by and large,
when one is younger one has access to a more variedgroupof individuals (in terms
of their ¯nal educational attainment) than when one is older.1
The role of the environment is re°ected in the degree to which individuals
are segregated in the ¯rst stage. To make this di®erentiation stark, we assume
that a fraction µ of individuals are perfectly segregated. Within this segment of
society, segregation ensures that types do not mix, even when relatively young.
Thus, skilled individuals (or individuals who will become skilled) meet only other
skilled individuals in the ¯rst round; likewise, unskilled meet only other unskilled
in the ¯rst round. The remaining 1¡ µ fraction of the population is not segre-
gated. Thus, for the unsegregated portion of the population, if ¸ is the fraction
of the population that is skilled, then the probability of a skilled and an unskilled
individual \meeting" in the ¯rst round is given by ¸(1 ¡ ¸).
The degree ofsegregationµ ofthe population re°ects, amongotherthings, both
the residential and schooling environment: e.g., how much society is divided into
gatedcommunities, exclusive suburbs, depressedghettos; thedegreeof segregation
of schools and within a school; the variance of school quality; the prevalence of
exclusive private schools and low quality urban public schools; tracking by ability
within a school, magnet schools, etc.
We will be interested in examining the consequences to society of an increase
in the degree of segregation, µ. Undoubtedly, µ is itself an endogenous variable,
a®ected by the amount of inequality in society. It is, however, also amenable
to public policy. That is, if schools are locally ¯nanced (as in the US), there is,
for the same amount of inequality, a greater incentive to segregate along income
lines into neighborhoods than if schools are centrally funded (as in most European
countries) since local ¯nancing gives an incentive for higher-incomeindividualsnot
to mix with lower-income people as di®erent housing values implies redistribution
1Other matching models are also possible such as random matching over time with discount-
ing. The formulation we have chosen is very tractable and allows us to get rid of the multiple
equilibria that can result otherwise.
5from those with more expensive property to those with less.2 Or, if highways are
built allowing easy access from suburbs to jobs in the city, it is easier to segregate
into di®erent neighborhoods than in their absence. Alternatively, the placing of
some public low-income housing in richer communities or the existence of a lower
variance in the quality of schooling may allow a lower degree of segregation for
the same degree of inequality.3
In order to determine who will match with whom, we need to specify utilities
from forming a household. For now, we do not impose any structure other
than: (i) Individuals share the same utility from a match. This ensures, for
example, that there is no bargaining problem between spouses over the allocation
of household income; and (ii) In forming a match, individuals obtain utility both
from consumption and from the quality of the match. These two components are
assumed to be additively separable. The assumptions above permit us to write
the indirect utility from a partner in a match of quality q and household income
I as:
V (I;q) = v(I) +q (2.1)
where v is assumed to be concave.
We assume that quality is perfectly observable to both participants and that
it is completely match speci¯c. The draws of quality are independently distrib-
uted across rounds and participants. Thus, quality (like beauty, supposedly) is
completely in the eye of the beholder, and furthermore is mutual (i.e., the two
participants to a match do not disagree about the match quality). Lastly, solely
to simplify algebraic presentation, we assume that quality is distributed identi-
cally across both types of individuals (skilled and unskilled) so that quality is an
iid draw from a cumulative distribution Q in each round of matching.
Note that the assumptions above imply that if two individuals of the same
type meet in the ¯rst round, either because they belong to the segregated part
2See Fern¶ andez and Rogerson (1996, 1998) for an analysis of the consequences of a local
system of school ¯nance.
3The way we have modelled segregation is symmetric for skilled and unskilled inviduals.
However, one could well model it as an unsymmetric phenomenon with a fraction µs of the
skilled population and a potentially di®erent fraction µu of the unskilled seceding or being
excluded from the rest of the population. This would then imply that the unsegregated part
of the population would now consist of a proportion
(1¡µs)¸
(1¡µs)¸+(1¡µu)(1¡¸) of skilled individuals
and a proportion
(1¡µu)(1¡¸)
(1¡µs)¸+(1¡µu)(1¡¸)of unskilled individuals. As we do not have data on the
magnitudes of these parameters, we model it as symmetric.
6of society or because they met someone of their own type at random, they will
accept any match quality above the mean ¹ = E(q) of the quality distribution and
reject any that is below. This follows from the fact that their household income
is invariant to proceeding to the second round (whereupon they are guaranteed to
meet someone of their own type). If, on the other hand, a skilled and unskilled
individual meet in the ¯rst round (thus, only from the non-segregated part of
society), then a skilled individual will only accept the match if q is greater than
q¤, given by:
q
¤ = v(Iss)¡ v(Isu)+ ¹ (2.2)
i.e., a quality of match such that a skilled individual is indi®erent between obtain-
ing the household income of two skilled individuals, Iss, with an expected match
quality of ¹ and settling for a lower household income of Isu.
2.2. The Labor Market, Family Income, and Sorting
We next turn to the determinationof household income. Given a constant returns
to scale production function
F(Ls;Lu) = LF(¸;1¡ ¸) (2.3)
where Li, i 2 fs;ug denotes the amount of labor of type i and L = Ls + Lu, the
assumption of a perfectively competitive labor market implies that wages depend
only on the fraction ¸ of skilled individuals in the population, i.e.,
ws(¸) = F1(¸;1 ¡ ¸) and wu(¸) = F2(¸;1¡ ¸) (2.4)
Most often we will be concerned not with the skilled wage but with its value
net of the monetary cost p of acquiring skills, which we denote by e ws. Assuming
that individuals work only in the second period (whereupon they repay the cost
of acquiring skills if they become skilled), and letting Iij denote the household





2 e ws(¸); if ij = ss
e ws(¸) + wu(¸); if ij = su
2wu(¸); if ij = uu
(2.5)
7Thus we can express q¤ in (2.2) as a function solely of ¸, i.e., q¤(¸). Note that q¤
is not a function of µ.
The observations above immediately permits us to solve for the proportion '
of each type of household that will form in the population as a function of ¸ and





µ¸t + (1¡ µ)[¸2
t + ¸t(1¡ ¸t)Q(q¤(¸t))]; if ij = ss
(1¡ µ)2¸t(1¡ ¸t)(1¡ Q(q¤(¸t)); if ij = su
µ(1¡ ¸t)+ (1¡ µ)[(1 ¡ ¸t)2 +¸t(1¡ ¸t)Q(q¤(¸t))]; if ij = uu (2.6)
Remark 1. The degree of correlation of spouses in education (or skill type), ½,
is given by µ + (1¡ µ)Q(q¤)
It is useful tonotethefollowing features of thiscorrelation: (i) it is independent
of ¸ except via the endogenous dependence of q¤ on ¸; (ii) if there is complete
segregation (µ = 1), then ½ = 1; if there is no segregation (µ = 0), then ½ =
Q(q¤); (iii) if individuals only cared about household income and not quality then
Q(q¤) = 1 and ½ = 1; if individuals simply matched with whomever they met in
the ¯rst round (i.e., Q(q¤) = 0), then the degree of correlation would be governed
solely by the degree of segregation of the environment, and hence ½ = µ.
2.3. The Education Choice
Next we consider a young individual's decision to become skilled. The expected
utility from becoming skilled (gross of any disutility from e®ort, as will be dis-
cussed shortly), given that a fraction ¸t+1 also become skilled, is given by:








whereas the expected utility of becoming an unskilled worker is:











8Note that the expected payo® from becoming skilled includes the monetary cost
of acquiring an education as skilled wages in both (2.7) and (2.7) are expressed
as net of p.
Next we turn to the dependence of a child's decisions on her family type. We
introduce two di®erent ways in which a family may matter (i) family background;
(ii) borrowing constraints. We consider each in turn.
In addition to bearing a monetary cost if they choose to become skilled, indi-
viduals also face an idiosyncratic (non-monetary) e®ort cost °i. This magnitudeof
this cost can be thought of as being in°uencedby parental background as re°ected
in the education of these, which can facilitate or make more di±cult the child's
acquisition of human capital. We allow therefore the distribution of the e®ort
cost to depend on family type and indicate by Gij(°) its cumulative distribution.
To simplify exposition, we assume that the draws are perfectly correlated within
a family and that ° enters linearly in a skilled individual's utility function, i.e.,
the payo® to individual i of becoming a skilled worker is given by V s
i = V s ¡ °i.
De¯ne by °¤(¸) the skilled-unskilled payo® di®erential generated when a frac-
tion ¸ of the population becomes skilled, i.e.,
°¤(¸t+1) ´ V s(¸t+1) ¡ V u(¸t+1) (2.8)
Note that an individual with idiosyncratic cost °i of becoming skilled who expects
a fraction ¸ of her cohort to become skilled would also prefer to be skilled as long
as °i · °¤(¸).
Next we turn to the e®ect of parental income on a child's decision to acquire
an education. We assume that in order to ¯nance the acquisition of skilled
education, children need to access capital markets.4 Capital markets are unable
to monitor how thesefunds arespent sothatparental incomemustact as collateral
for children. We assume that children within the same family with n¡1 siblings
can borrow up to some (increasing) function Z(I;n) of parental income (e.g., the
latter acts as collateral), so that the (integer part) of the solution to:
Z(I;n) = mp (2.9)
yields the maximum number mnij = intm of skilled individuals a family with n
children and income Iij can produce. Note that mnij is in general a function of
¸ as this determines family income. For simplicity, we assume that fertility is
4A bequest model would have similar implications.
9exogenous, but we allow the number of children n that a family has to depend on
family type by modeling it as a random draw from a cumulative distribution Hij.
We denote by ´nij the probability that a family of type ij has n = f0;1;2;:::;¹ ng











as the fraction of children that will become skilled given that they belong to
families of type ij and that an expected fraction ¸t+1 of that cohort also plans to
become skilled.
Note that in the absence of borrowing constraints, min[mnij;n] = n and hence
¡ij = Gij(°¤). Furthermore, note that if under this scenario the distribution of
non-monetary costs were independent of family background, i.e., Gij = G 8ij,
then all families would produce the same fraction of skilled children independent
of type. In general, however, ¡ij is a function both of ¸t (since parental income
determines the maximum number of children who can a®ord to become skilled)
and of the expected value of ¸t+1 (which given rational expectations must also
be the realized value), since this determines the incentive for individuals with
di®erent °i to desire to become skilled.
2.4. Equilibrium
An equilibrium at time t and t + 1; for an initial division of the population into
skilled andunskilled(¸t), isgivenbymarriage decisionsas speci¯edby (2.2), wages
as speci¯ed by (2.4), and decisions by children to become skilled as speci¯ed by
(2.10). It is easy to ensure the existence of an interior equilibrium by placing
conditions on the production function or on the Z function such that even if
¸ = 0, some portion of children can a®ord to become skilled. This ensures that
the economy does not get stuck in a poverty trap in which no one can a®ord
to become skilled. To bound ¸ away from one it is su±cient to assume that
technology is such that F1 < F2 for some ¸ < 1. As shown in the Appendix (to
be done), under a mild assumption to ensure that °¤(¸t+1) ´ V s(¸t+1)¡V u(¸t+1)
is decreasing in ¸, equilibrium will also be unique.
Equilibrium can be depicted as the intersection of two curves as shown in Fig-
ure 1. In this ¯gure, the downward sloping curve gives the di®erence between V s
10and V u as a function of ¸t. The upward sloping line is generated by consider-
ing, for a given ¸t¡1, the fraction of individuals that both are willing to and can
a®ord to become skilled as a function of °, ¸t =
P
ij 'ij(¸t¡1)¡ij(°;¸t¡1)fij P
ij 'ij(¸t¡1)fij . From
this relationship we can solve for ° as a function of (¸t¡1;¸t) which we denote by
ª(¸t¡1;¸t). This curve is upward sloping since an increase in ° will increase the
supply of skilled labor from all family types.
2.5. Dynamics
We now turn to specifying the dynamic evolution of this economy. The working

























In general this model may have multiple steady states as the initial condition
of the economy may determine which steady state it converges to. This is due
to a non-convexity in the form of a discrete amount needed to become skilled
and to the presence of borrowing constraints. For example, for a given degree of
segregation, an economy that starts out with a low fraction of skilled individuals
and thus high inequality between skilled and unskilled, may end up in a steady
11state that reproduces those features due to the fact that uu type families will
have low income and are more likely to be constrained. On the other hand, an
economy with the same degree of segregation but with a large fraction of skilled
individuals will have low inequality and low sorting and can end up in a steady
state with a high fraction of skilled individuals as uu family income will be higher
and thus they are less likely to be constrained.
In any case, the potential multiplicity of steady states is not the feature of the
analysis we wish to emphasize. Our calibration procedure will select a steady
state and we will be interested in the e®ect of a change in segregation we will be
given that initial steady state. We now turn to an analysis of this.
3. The E®ect of an Increase in Segregation
The e®ect of an increase in segregation in this model depends on: (i) whether
the number of children that become skilled next period's skilled is a concave or
convex function of parental human capital; (ii) whether the growthrate of fertility
is concave or convex in parental types; (iii) the e®ect of an increase in segregation
on the expected utility di®erential of skilled relative to unskilled individuals.
This can be seen most clearly by totally di®erentiating (2.14) with respect to











































is requiredtobe positive in order for the original steady-state to be locally stable.5
5Note that
@Áij(¸¤;µ)
@¸ has two components: one is what happens to the proportion of couples
of di®erent types due to the change in ¸; the other is what happens to these proportions as a
results of the change in q¤ brought about by the change in wages that result from the change in
¸.
12Note that throughout this analysis we are assuming that any change in wages
brought about by the change in¸ does not alter how binding borrowing constraints
are.
Let us consider the two lines in 3.1 separately.6 Consider the ¯rst term
in the square brackets: This term shows the e®ect on the number of children
who become skilled of, ceteris paribus, replacing 2 su couples by one ss and one
uu couple{which is what an increase in segregation does. If the relationship is
concave in parental years of education (and as we shall show for the UK data
it is), then an increase in sorting will tend to decrease the number of skilled
children. Alternatively, this can be expressed as stating that if the production
of skilled children has a negative cross-partial in each parent's years of education
(i.e., if the marginal increase in the number of skilled children brought about by
an increase in one parent's education is decreasing in the years of education of the
other parent) then the number of skilled children will be maximized by mixing s
and u individuals in couples rather than by creating homogenous couples.
The second term in the square brackets reminds us that what we are interested
in is not the number of skilled children per se, but rather their proportion in the
population. It gives the change in the aggregate economy's fertility rate as a
result of an increase in segregation (i.e., the replacement of 2 su couples by one ss
and one uu couple). If this term is positive (we are subtracting it) it reinforces
the negative ¯rst term as it shows that average fertility rate would increase thus
ensuring that the smaller number of skilled children also translates into a smaller
fraction of skilled children. Again, for our UK statistics this term is indeed
positive.
The sign of the second line is given by the sign of @°¤
@µ which indicates what
happens to the di®erential between skilled and unskilled individuals' expected
utility if, ceteris paribus, segregation is increased. At ¯rst blush, one might think
that this term must be unambiguously positive. Skilled individuals will be made
better o® if they have a greater chance to meet with other skilled individuals (and
thus enjoy higher household income with a greater probability). This intuition is
correct. Where one's intuition may be misleading is in concluding that unskilled
individuals will necessarily be made worse o®. The e®ect on V u is actually
ambiguous. Although unskilled individuals now have a lower chance of matching
with skilled individuals and enjoying higher income through that match, if this
probability was low in the ¯rst place because most matches were being rejected,
6The ¯rst line is the same as in Fern¶ andez and Rogerson (forthcoming) but the second has
no counterpart there.
13then there is a positive counterpart to increased segregation. This counterpart
is the fact that unskilled individuals need not waste their time (their matching
opportunities) on a match that will happen only with a low probability and if
rejected leaves them with a match quality of expected value ¹. Instead it allows
a greater proportion of them to make better use of the two rounds by having their
matches be only with other unskilled individuals and thus permitting them an







@(V s ¡V u)
@µ
= (1¡ Q(q¤))[(q¤¡ ¹)¡ ¸(vss ¡ 2vsu ¡ vuu)] +




Note that concavity of v ensures that vss ¡ 2vsu ¡ vuu is negative and thus that
the expression in the ¯rst square brackets is positive. The ambiguity comes
from the second term where the expression in the square brackets is negative,
re°ecting the gain in expected match quality{with probability Q(q¤) the match
would have been rejected by the skilled individual resulting in expected match
quality Q(q¤)¹ whereas with increased segregation the expected match quality
is instead
R q
¹ qdQ + Q(¹)¹. Thus the sign of the second expression depends on
whether ¸ is greater or smaller than 1=2. Note therefore that the expected utility
di®erential will unambiguously increase if ¸ is smaller than 1=2. If ¸ > :5 and
if Q(q¤) is very close to one (i.e., skilled individuals reject almost all matches
with unskilled individuals) then the di®erential can decrease. The reason that
¸ > :5 appears as a condition for the di®erential to fall is that both skilled and
unskilled workers are made better of by the increase in expected match quality
due to increased segregation. If, however, 1 ¡ ¸ was low, then skilled workers
only had a low probability of meeting an unskilled workers whereas an unskilled
worker has a high probability (¸) of meeting a skilled worker. Thus, in order for
the gain to unskilled workers to be greater than that to skilled workers requires
¸ > 1 ¡ ¸, i.e., ¸ > :5. Note that this requirement makes it relatively unlikely
that
@°¤
@µ < 0 since Q(q¤) is increasing in the wage di®erential and thus reaches its
maximum at ¸ = 0. Thus, in general, one would expect an increase in segregation
to increase the relative attractiveness of becoming skilled.
To summarize, the e®ect of an increase in segregation is ambiguous. For
the UK, in the absence of a supply response, ¸ should fall. When there is a
14supply response, i.e., @G
@° 6= 0, the e®ect is ambiguous. We now turn to the
parameterization of our model.
4. Parameterizing the Model
In this section we parameterize our model by choosing parameter values so that
the cross-sectional data generated by the steady-state of our model are consistent
with those observed in actual UK data.
We proceed by constructing a sample of parents and children. Our primary
datasource is theBritishCohort Study(BCS). This survey beganwithall children
born between in one week in April 1970 in the UK. Parental education data was
obtained from a retrospective questionnaire of parents conducted ¯ve years later
in the BCS survey of 1975. The education data of children is obtained when
these are 26 years old from the BCS 1996 survey. There they report their highest
quali¯cation level, which we map into years of education by considering how long
it usually takes to obtain the stated level. In order to include a child in the
sample we require both the data on parental and children educational attainment
to be present. After eliminating the categories of \not known, not stated, or
non-applicable", we were left with a sample of 6361 children with their respective
parents.7 In general, if an individual indicated no quali¯cations, 10 years of
educations were assigned. Individuals with any secondary quali¯cations were
assigned 11 years; those with advanced vocational quali¯cations and some A level
were assigned 13 years; those with a sub-degree level of further education (such
as nursing and higher education diplomas) were assigned 15 years; whereas those
with a degree and higher were assigned 16 years.8
From our BCS sample, we can calculate how correlated spouses are in their
years of education (i.e., ½). We ¯nd ½ = :5 which is lower than the :6 that we ¯nd
for couples around the same age bracket in the US. Recall that the correlation
of spouses in our model is given by ½ = µ + (1¡ µ)Q(q¤). Thus, for the case in
which all marital sorting is exogenous (Q(q¤) = 0) we set µ = :5. For the case in
which we allow both endogenous sorting and segregation, we set µ = :1 implying
that Q(q¤) = 4
9.
Note that in the second case, the requirement that ½ = :5 and q¤ > ¹ implies
that for any positive choice of µ, Q must be a distribution such that the mean lies
7Each sibling in a pair of twins or higher multiple births was included as an independent
observation.
8The details of the coding into years of education are available by request from the author.
15below the median. A simple distribution that possesses this property is the step
distribution whose cdf is given by:
x
2a




a · x · h
for a >
h
2. Of course, we would like to calibrate our function not just to a point
but also to a slope. We have found no literature to guide us on this but ¯nd it
useful to use the function above anyway. For all our experiments, this function
will produce a constant frequency (since in the vecinity of the steady state the
distribution is uniform), which seems like a reasonable assumption. That is, if
skilled individuals increase their pickiness by ¢q, they will decrease the fraction
of unskilled individuals that they are willing to match with by an amount that is
proportional to ¢q.
Next we consider the choice of the Gij's. Ofcourse, we have no direct measure
of these. Using our sample of parents and children, however, we can ¯nd the
fraction of children from each family type that becomes skilled. In order to do
this, we need to introduce a cuto® in achievement below which we consider an
individual unskilled. We choose to call all individuals with at least two A levels
(or their equivalent) skilled and all those below are considered unskilled.9 We
¯nd that this fraction is .77 for type ss; .52 for type su; and lastly .23 for type uu.
Thus, we require the steady state of our model to satisfy ¡ss = :77, ¡su = :52,
and ¡uu = :23. It is of interest to contrast these with the US where, de¯ning as
skilled anyone who has gone beyond a high-school degree, yields :81, :63 and :30
respectively.
In the absence of any knowledge of what the \correct" distribution of the °'s
might be, we assume that they are uniformally distributed with di®erent means.
In addition to requiring these to match the ¡ij's we also ask that in aggregate
they produce a supply response that is in accordance with the literature in this
area. We leave the description of the exact calibration to section 5:3.
Next we turn to the fertility pro¯les. As the BCS data does not have fertility
ofparents , weuse the BritishHousehold Panel Survey (BHPS) of1992to examine
this question. We construct a sample of women (with their partners) who were
between the ages of 18 to 35 in 1970. The couple's fertility is then identi¯ed
9In our mapping from achievement to years of education, this is equivalent to considering
skilled those individuals with more than 13 years of education.
16from the retrospective fertility data taken in 1992 and the education of the two
partners in the couple is obtained.10 We ¯nd that the fertility of ss couples is
2.07; that of su couples is 2.11; and that of uu couples is 2.18. It is of interest
to contrast this fertility pro¯le with that of the US (respectively, 1.84, 1.90 and
2.26), not for the absolute numbers, but for the fact that it the UK's is far more
similar across family types than that of the US.
We calibrate our fertility distributions by assuming thatthe fertility of a family
type is a random draw from a binomial distribution over the two integers that
bracket the average fertility rate for that type (i.e., either two or three for all
types), such that the expected value of that distribution equals that family type's
average fertility. Thus, ´2ss = :93, ´2su = :89, and ´2uu = :82.
Lastly, we choose to calibrate a constant elasticity of substitution production
function:
F(Ls;Lu) = A[bL±















Based on data in Machin (1999), we match a skill premium of 1:8 as our bench-
mark. We also make use of the survey by Katz and Autor (1999) which suggests
that a reasonable elasticity of substitution to match lies between 1 and 2:5. We
choose to match an elasticity of substitution of 1:5 as our benchmark case, imply-
ing ± = 1=3. We also set theinitial value of wu equal to 30;000as a normalization.
We leave the discussion of the results of the parameterization of the model to
the next section in which they are compared with the new steady state resulting
from an increase in µ.
4.1. Welfare Analysis
Both in order to evaluate welfare and to be able to examine the endogenous
response in sorting resulting from an increase in the degree of segregation in the
10A bias of using this method is that we only obtain fertility data from couples that are still
together in 1992.
17economy, we need to specify the household's utility function v. We choose to
work with log utility, so:
v(I) = logI
which implies that q¤ = log
2e ws
e ws+wu + ¹. Note that an increase in e ws will decrease
q¤ whereas an increase in wu will increase q¤.11
There areseveral measuresofwelfare that arepotentially ofinterest. The most
important statistic to report is what happens to skilledand unskilled workers, i.e.,
V s and V u. It is useful to convert the measure of the change in utility to the
percentage change in all household incomes the individual would have to gain in
theoriginal steady state so as tobe indi®erent betweenitandthe steady statethat
emerges as a result of a change in segregation. Thus, we can ¯nd ¢i i 2 fs;ug
such that
V i0(1 +¢i) = V i1
where 0 indicates the original steady state and 1 indicates the new steady state.
So, for example, we would solve for ¢s by solving for its value that set V s0(1 +
¢s) = [µ +(1¡ µ)¸0][log2 e ws(1+ ¢s)+
R q
¹ qdQ +Q(¹)¹] +(1¡ µ)(1¡ ¸t+1)[(1¡
Q(q¤))log( e ws +wu)(1+¢s)+
R q
0 qdQ +Q(q¤)(log2 e ws(1+¢s)+¹)] equal to V s1.
It is easy to show that
log(1+ ¢i) = V
i1 ¡ V
i0
Another interesting measure ofwelfare is anindividual's ex-ante welfare. That
is, we can think of the individual as having a probability of being born to a family
type ij as given by
'ijfij P
ij 'ijfij and then becoming skilled with probability ¡ij(°¤;¸)
and obtaining expected utility V s¡
R °¤
0 °dGij
Gij(°¤) in that case, and becoming unskilled
with probability 1¡ ¡ij(°¤;¸) and obtaining expected utility V u. Summing over
all the family types, we obtain that an (unborn) individual's ex-ante utility, U, is
given by:
11Given our choice of utility function, we ¯nish our calibration of the distribution of quality
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Again we can convert the change in ex-ante expected utility in the pre and post
increasedsegregation steady states by solvingfor the fraction ¢ that an individual
have to obtain from all household incomes in the original steady state so as to be
indi®erent between the two steady states (U0 and U1). As before, it is easy to
show that ¢ solves log(1+¢) = U1 ¡ U0. Note that the last term in expression
(4.1) is the expected disutility from the e®ort cost to become skilled. As we will
need to refer to it in our welfare calculations, we shall henceforth denote it by
W(°¤;¸).
5. Response to an Increase in Segregation
We will be examining three di®erent possible scenarios. The ¯rst is one in which
almost all behavior is exogenous in that both the supply response is ¯xed and
the degree of sorting is not a®ected by any changes in the environment. In the
second scenario, we allow for sorting to respond to incentives, but keep the supply
response of factors ¯xed. In the last scenario, both relative supplies of factors
and the degree of sorting respond to their environment.
In all cases the calibration procedure is similar. The parameters A, b, ±, µ
and the steady state value of ¸ are determined by the wage premium, the normal-
ization of the initial value of the unskilled wage, the elasticity of substitution, the
correlation of spouses in their years of education, and the ¡ij values. This will
uniquely determine steady-state ¸ and is the extent of the calibration needed for
the ¯rst scenario. The second scenario endogenizes the degree of sorting. This
is done by introducing a quality distribution Q(q). As discussed previously, we
calibrate it by requiring that when combined with an initial choice on the degree
of segregation µ = :1 and evaluated at q¤ (i.e., the value of match quality such
that a skilled individual is indi®erent between matching with an unskilled indi-
vidual and obtaining a match with another skilled individual with match quality
¹ as speci¯ed in equation (2.2)), it matches the correlation of spouses found in
the data. Note that this procedure yields an equilibrium di®erence in V s and V u
(i.e., °¤). Thus, our last exercise is to introduce a supply response in terms of a
distribution of °'s given by Gij's such that when evaluated at °¤ they yield the
¡ij's and the supply response observed in the data.
195.1. Exogenous sorting and supply response
We ¯rst examine the consequences in changes in the degree of segregation in an
economy in which almost all behavior is exogenously speci¯ed. That is, we will
explore the e®ect of an increase in environmental segregation (i.e., µ) assuming
that there is no endogenous component to sorting, i.e., Q(q¤) = 0 and hence ½ = µ,
i.e., the degree of segregation is the same as the degree of correlation of spouses.
In addition we assume that there is no endogenous response of the ¡ij's to the
change in sorting. This assumption can be made consistent with microeconomic
foundations, but for the moment we can simply interpret this constancy as the
outcome of some socioeconomic/genetic process such that the ¡ij's are constant.12
Thus, changes in the relative supplies of skilled and unskilled labor are governed
by changes in the relative frequency of di®erent family types. This is a very
useful benchmark as it is the most \mechanical" approach that still respects the
fact that there are fertility di®erentials as well as propensities for children to
become skilled that di®er across family types. Furthermore, this will allow for an
easy comparison with the results obtained for the US by Fern¶ andez and Rogerson
(forthcoming).
Table 1 below reports the results of the calibration in the ¯rst row and the
response toanincrease in segregation(equivalent here to the correlation of spouses
in their years of education) from :5 to :6 in the second row.
Table 1
Increase in Segregation: Exogenous Responses
¸ ws wu stdlogy stdlogfy Vs Vu
µ = :5 0.49161 54000 30000 0.29385 0.25536 11.509 11.082
µ = :6 0.48823 54179 29828 0.29834 0.26766 11.523 11.061
¢s = 0:0149 ¢u = ¡0:0208 ¢ = ¡0:0049
.
The results of the baseline calibration yields around 49% of individuals who
are skilled. This is a bit higher than the 41% reported by Green and Steedman
(1997) as the fraction of 18 year olds that have attained 2 A levels or level 3 Vqs
in England in 1995, but the trend toward higher quali¯cations is increasing so
the ¯gure may be higher when a new \steady state" is attained. The standard
deviation of log income is small relative to its actual value of :5 in the national
12In Fernandez and Rogerson (forthcoming) individuals either have or do not have ability to
become skilled (e.g., ° 2 f0;1g). Thus a child's ° can be considered a draw from a binomial
distribution Gij.
20labor force survey, but that is to be expected since all the variation in personal
income in the model is produced by two wages only.
Next we turn to the consequences of an increase in the degree of segregation.
We know from the theory discussed previously, that an increase in segregation will
necessarily decrease ¸ if fss¡ss¡2fsu¡su+fuu¡uu is negative and (fss¡2fsu+fuu)
is positive. Using the UK numbers for these parameters we obtain ¡:1198 and 0:3
respectively. Thus, an increase in µ will unambiguously decrease the proportion
of skilled people in the new steady state.
As shown in row 2 of Table 1, the e®ect of an increase in the correlation of
spouses is to decrease ¸ from :492 to :488 (around 0:69%). This increases the
skilled wage by :33%, decreases the unskilled wage by :57%, and serves to increase
the inequality in the personal income distribution as measured by the standard
deviation of logy (as shown in column 4) and in the distribution of family income
(as shown in column 5 by logfy). The standard deviation of personal log income
increases by 1:52% and that of family income increases by 4:81%. Skilled workers
are made better o® (they would require a 1.5%increase in household incomes to be
as well o® in the original steady state); unskilled workers are made worse o® (they
would require a 2% decrease in the original steady-state household incomes to be
indi®erent). Ex-ante welfare falls and a :5% decrease in the original steady-state
household incomes would be required to create indi®erence.
Although the change in the income distribution is not negligible, the response
of the individual income distribution is small relative to what we found for the
US (close to a 5% increase for an increase in µ from :6 to :7). Of course, that
calibration was to di®erent parameters for the wage premium and µ, but the main
di®erence stems from the fertility and ¡ij pro¯les as noted earlier.
The easiest way to understand the contributions of the fertility and ¡ij pro¯les
is by calibrating the steady state of the model using some of the US statistics.
In Table 2 below, we show the result of replacing the UK fertility pro¯le by the
US one, recalibrating the model and increasing µ to :6. Now the increase in
segregation produces an increase in the standard deviation of the log of personal
income of around 2:22%. Skilled workers' welfare improves by more than before;
unskilled workers' welfare fall by more. The decrease in ex ante welfare is likewise
greater.
21Table 2
Increase in Segregation: Exogenous Responses
US fertility, UK ¡ij
¸ ws wu stdlogy stdlogfy Vs Vu
µ = :5 0.4574 54000 30000 0.29282 0.25529 11.504 11.076
µ = :6 0.4523 54293 29756 0.29932 0.26925 11.522 11.054
¢s = 0:0174 ¢u = ¡0:0218 ¢ = ¡0:0064
Even more dramatically, as shown in Table 3, if we replace instead the UK's
¡ij pro¯le with that of the US (keeping the UK fertility pro¯le) and recalibrate
the model, an increase in µ to 0:6 now produces an increase in personal inequality
of 4:20%.
It is interesting to think about what the di®erence in the US and UK ¡ij
pro¯les imply. The important thing to note is not the fact that these numbers
are larger for each family type in the US than in the UK nor the slope of the
relationship, but rather that in the US a child's chances of becoming skilled are
relatively more improved by switching from uu parents to su parents than by
switching from su parents to ss. In the UK, on the other hand, it is almost as
signi¯cant to switch from uu parents to su ones as it is to switch from su parents
to ss parents. That it, the US relationship is more concave than the UK one,
and hence an increase in segregation will have more important e®ects there than
for the UK. The easiest way to see this is by examining the ratio between ¡su
and ¡ss+¡uu
2 which is 1.135 for the US whereas it is 1.0505 for the UK (a linear
relationship would yield a ratio of 1).
Table 3
Increase in Segregation: Exogenous Responses
UK fertility, US ¡ij
¸ ws wu stdlogy stdlogfy Vs Vu
µ = :5 0.6384 54000 30000 0.28239 0.24194 11.527 11.106
µ = :6 0.6308 54286 29503 0.29427 0.26121 11.539 11.071
¢s = 0:0124 ¢u = ¡0:0342 ¢ = ¡0:0082
Lastly, Table 4 shows the result of using both the US fertility and ¡ij pro¯les.
Inthis case the e®ect ofthe increase inthe degree ofsegregation is to increase per-
sonal inequality by 5:38%, even more thanwhat Fern¶ andezandRogerson obtained
for the US.
22Table 4
Increase in Segregation: Exogenous Responses
US fertility, US ¡ij
¸ ws wu stdlogy stdlogfy Vs Vu
µ = :5 0.6098 54000 30000 0.28671 0.24632 11.523 11.101
µ = :6 0.5995 54112 29370 0.23021 0.26882 11.538 11.063
¢s = 0:0147 ¢u = ¡0:0372 ¢ = ¡0:01070
Note that in all cases the increase inthe inequality of the distribution of family
income is much greater than that in personal income. This is due to the fact
that not only does the income of unskilled individuals fall, but also the probability
of a mixed household (skilled with unskilled) decreases thereby exacerbating the
inequality in family income.
5.2. Endogenous Sorting
The second analysis allows sorting to be endogenous. In order to examine the
e®ect of an increase in segregation when sorting is endogenous, we arbitrarily set
µ = :1 and thus obtain Q(q¤) =
4
9 resulting in a correlation of spouses equal to :5.
Now we increase of µ from :1 to a value such that, if there were no endogenous
response in sorting, would produce a correlation of spouses of :6. This occurs at
µ = :28: Table 5 below shows the result of the increase in segregation in the new
steady state..
23Table 5
Increase in Segregation: Endogenous Sorting











¢s = 0:0153 ¢u = ¡0:0205 ¢ = ¡0:0046
Note that the increased segregation now produces a correlationof spouses that
slightly exceeds :6 as skilled individuals react to the increased wage inequality by
becoming pickier (i.e., requiring a higher q¤) in order to accept a match with
an unskilled individual. This causes ¸ to fall by very slightly more than in
the ¯rst case as even fewer matches between skilled and unskilled individuals
are formed. Unskilled individuals would be willing to give up around 2.18% of
householdincome toreturn tothe original steady state, whereas skilled individuals
would be willing to give up around 1.7% of income to maintain the new steady
state. These last numbers di®er more than others did compared with their
counterparts in Table 1 since they re°ect the fact that individuals obtain utility
from the quality of their matches as well as from income and thus a change in
segregation a®ects utility through this channel as well.
5.3. Endogenous Sorting and Supply
The last analysis we perform is to allow both sorting and the ¡ij's to respond
to the change in segregation. Note that incorporating an endogenous supply
response does not require us to recalibrate the entire model; it simply requires
us to calibrate the Gij's so that when evaluated at °¤ it matches the parameter
values given by the data described below.13 Throughout we will assume that the
13°¤ is the di®erence between V s and V u produced in the steady-state of the calibrated model.
24changes observedinwages do not changethe bindingness of borrowingconstraints.
We assume that the °'s are uniformly distributed with a cumulative distribu-
tion given by Gij(°) =
°¡aij
k¡aij. We calibrate the three aij's and the k by using four
statistics. The ¯rst three statistics are the fractions of children of each family
type that become skilled, i.e., the ¡ij's given by the data. We require that the
Gij's evaluated at the steady-state level of °¤ (and given an assumption about
how binding borrowing constraints are across di®erent family and fertility types)
match the ¡ij's given by the data.14 The last statistic is much more problematic.
We would like to know what the supply response of skilled labor is to something
like a change in the skill premium or a change in p. These numbers very much
depend on the model one is estimating.
In the absence of any parameter estimates for the UK, we rely primarily on
Kane (1994) who examines the college enrollment of 18-19 year olds from 1973
to 1988 in the US. Using a pooled time series cross-section of states (which pro-
vides variation in tuition costs and enrollment), Kane estimates a probit model
of ¯nishing high school and attending college. He is then able to examine the
simulated e®ects of an increase in tuition. He ¯nds that an increase in tuition
of $1000 decreases the enrollment of whites by about 3%. We translate this tu-
ition decrease into a percentage increase in the income di®erential of skilled and
unskilled individuals by converting this number into a change in this di®erential.
Given an average income di®erential of around $10,000 over this period, we have
a 10% change in the income di®erential. Thus, we calibrate our Gij's by requir-
ing that a change in skilled individuals' income from $54000 to $56400 (keeping
the unskilled wage ¯xed at 30000), yield a 3% increase in the fraction of skilled
individuals. The utility di®erential is generated not only by the change in skilled
wages, but also by the fact that any labor supply change will also change the
matching probabilities. We maintain the frequencies of the di®erent family types
¯xed at their original level. This procedure yields us the aij's and the k.
Kane also ¯nds though that the e®ect of a dollar in earnings di®erentials
was worth roughly 1=5th of a dollar change in net direct costs in terms of how
responsive individuals were to attending college. In terms of net present value,
however, his calculations indicate that a dollar increase in the initial earnings
di®erential should be worth roughly $5.20 in direct costs. Thus, individual are
responding by 1/26 less to a change in tuition then to a change in direct costs
when translated to net present value. This suggests that our change of wages
from $54000 to $56400 should produce a 0:115% increase in the fraction of skilled
14°¤ is the di®erence between V s and V u produced in the steady-state of the calibrated model.
25individuals. We thus repeat our calibration using 0:15% (slightly larger than
above) as our parameter estimate.
It is di±cult to place a great deal of trust in any of these parameters. Heck-
man, Lochner and Taber (1998), for example, develop a general equilibrium model
of skill formation withheterogeous ability and on-the-jobinvestment. Calibrating
their model and simulating they conclude that a tuition increase of $1000 would
decrease the probability of attending college by about 0:07 on average. But their
calibration also implies that agents with ability in the second quartile from the
bottom would, on the basis of net present value of earnings, ¯nd it advantageous
to be unskilled workers and not attend college whereas those with lower ability (in
the bottom quartile) would be better o® going to college. Lastly Lee (2001) in a
similar model but without on-the-job-investment and with the option for agents
to stay home, ¯nds that an increase in the skill premium of 24.5% increased the
proportion of those who had attained at least one year of college from 39.6% to
42.6%, i.e., a proportionately 7.6% increase. Again, in terms of our model this
would imply that an increase in the skilled wage to $56400, keeping the unskilled
wage ¯xed (i.e., a 4.4% increase in the skill premium) should increase the fraction
of skilled workers by 1.36% which evaluated at our initial steady state implies an
increase in the workforce of :67%.15
Below we report our results parameterized to two di®erent cases. The ¯rst
whichwe call \largeresponse" is to produce an increase of 3%; the second, denoted
by \small response" is to produce an increase of .15%.
We specify borrowing constraints as I ¡ cn ¸ mp where c is some minimum
consumption level required by each child in the family. As this is an inequality
(andweare not usingdata tomatcheither corp, norare weexamining the e®ectof
changes in constraints), then in general, any particular ¡ij number does not have a
unique decomposition into a parameter of a given distribution and a assumption
about how binding is the borrowing constraint. For any distribution Gij, the





min[m;n]´nij can be decomposed several ways
into a family background and a borrowing constraint component.16
Table 6 below shows three such decompositions for our calibrated uniform
distributions for both the large and small response case. The ¯rst columnassumes
15The calculations for the increase in the proportion of skilled workers in resonse to the change
in the skill premium were done by Donghong Lee (personal correspondance) based on the model
and results from his thesis (2001).
16For all our calculations we arbitrarily set p = 1000.
26that the observed ¡ij's are the result only of family background; there are no
borrowing constraints (this is indicated by setting the maximum number of skilled
children that parents can produce equal to the total number of children, i.e.,
mnij = n). The second column is generated by assuming that there are mild
borrowing constraints in that uu families with three children can at most a®ord
to ¯nance the acquisition of skills for two of them. Note that the assumption of
mild credit constraints for uu families shifts their mean downwards as implied by
the assumption that their lower rate of production of skilled children re°ects not
only parental background as re°ected in the distribution of the °'s but also the
existence of borrowing constraints. The last column assumes that both su and
uu families with three children can a®ord to produce a maximum of two skilled
children.17
Table 6
Decomposition of ¡ij's into Means and Borrowing Constraints
large response mnij = n m3uu = 2 m3uu = 2; m3su = 2
¹ss 0.3658 0.3658 0.3658
¹su 0.4247 0.4247 0.4210
¹uu 0.4469 0.4459 0.4459
small response mnij = n m3uu = 2 m3uu = 2; m3su = 2
¹ss -1.1652 -1.1652 -1.1652
¹su 0.36580 0.3658 0.2688
¹uu 0.9425 0.9161 0.9161
We will use the second column of Table 6 as our benchmark. Note that the
borrowing constraints in this scenario are very mild in that only those uu families
with 3 children are a®ected, and only if their children have ° < °¤. This is less
than 2% of the population.
The introduction of an endogenous supply response to the change in incentives
radically alters the results of our ¯rst two analyses. Table 7 below shows the e®ect
17The fact that the means are negative comes from the calibration procedure. To accomodate
a small labor supply response some of the aij's are negative. This is not problematic from the
point of view of the model; it simply implies that some individuals enjoy becoming skilled and
thus will do so even if the di®erential is zero or negative. In any case, it is easy to get rid of this
feature by transforming the uniform distribution to a step function with all those individuals now
below zero now distributed uniformly between zero and some positive number smaller than °¤.
This transformation would leave the calibration unchanged and thus all the results unchanged
except our calculation of W and hence U.
27of an increase in segregation from its initial steady state value of :1 to :28 which,
as before, is the value of µ that would be required to produce a correlation of
spouses of :6 if there were no reaction of individuals to the change in segregation.
We discuss both cases of Table 7 in turn. Turning ¯rst to Table 7a, the ¯rst
result to note is that ¸ now increases by 2.5% rather than dropping by .7% as
it did in the exercise of the previous section. There are two e®ects here: the
¯rst is the one we have analyzed previously, that is, ceteris paribus, an increase
of correlation of types causes a destruction of mixed marriages which leads to a
lower average production of skilled children as a fraction of the population. The
second e®ect is a new one: ceteris paribus, the increase in segregation makes it
relatively more attractive to become skilled (i.e., °¤(¸) increases for a given ¸)
as now a skilled person will be more sure of being matched with another skilled
individual (whereas this probability decreases for an unskilled individual). Thus,
the ¯rst e®ect is to decrease ¸ whereas the second e®ect is to increase it.
The two e®ects are shown in Figure 2. The ¯rst e®ect is seen in that the ª
curve shifts up since a greater value of ° is required to produce a given ¸ given
that fss¡ss ¡2fsu¡su+ fuu¡uu is negative and (fss ¡ 2fsu +fuu) is positive. The
shift of this curve shows the negative e®ect of replacing 2 us couples with one uu
and one ss couple from the point of view of producing a greater skilled fraction
of the population. The second e®ect is shown in the the shift upwards of the
V s ¡ V u curve indicating the increase in the relative attractiveness of becoming
skilled for a given ¸. As can be seen in the ¯gure, the shifts of these two curves
necessarily increases °¤ (i.e., the di®erential in utilities between a skilled and an
unskilled person), but the net e®ect on ¸ depends on which curve shifts more. As
is clear from the result of our analysis above, for our choice of functional forms
and the UK numbers, the second e®ect dominates for both cases of Table 7.
As a result of the ¸ increase, the skilled wage drops by :12% whereas the
unskilled wage increases by 2:1%. This has a strong e®ect on the personal income
distribution as can be seen by the fact that the standard deviation of log income
falls by over 5:6%. The narrowing of the skill premium makes skilled individuals
less picky (i.e., q¤ falls) so that the correlation of spouses rises to .5987 rather
than to :6. Although the welfare lost due to e®ort (i.e., W) is higher in the new
steady state, this is due to the fact that more people ¯nd it attractive to become
skilled. In this scenario everyone is made better o® as can be by the fact that all
the ¢'s are positive. This is despite the fall in the skilled wage as the increase in
segregation more than compensates for this.18
18Note though that to examine the e®ect on the representative skilled person from family type
28The story told in Table 7b, however, is rather di®erent. The smaller increase
in ¸ (1.3%) resulting from the increase in segregation translates into a smaller
decrease in the skilled wage (.6%) and a smaller increase in the unskilled wage
(1.1%). As before, the expected utility of a skilled person increases. What is in-
teresting to note, however, is that despite the wage increase unskilled individuals
are on the whole left worse o® . Although they earn more, they are also less likely
to marry a skilled person, and this second e®ect outweighs the ¯rst.19 Unskilled
individuals would be willing to give up :58% of their original steady-state house-
hold income in order to remain in that steady state. Skilled individuals, on the
other hand, are made better o® despite the fall in skilled wages as they are now
more sure of matching with another skilled individual. They would be willing to
sacri¯ce .84% of the original steady state household income to change to the new
steady state. A surprising feature of Table 7b is that the welfare lost due to e®ort
W actually falls despite the fact that more people are becoming skilled. This is
due to the change in the frequency of family types. As a result of the increase
in ¸ and µ, there is a larger proportion of ss types which implies a tilt towards a
lower cost of becoming skilled.
In both supply cases, the inequality in utility increases despite the decrease
in income inequality as can be seen by the fact that °¤ ´ V s ¡ V u increases.
For the ¯rst time, however, the ex-ante expected utility of an unborn individual
is higher in the new steady state (in both cases); all household incomes would
have to be increased by .55% and .36% in the original steady state in order to
achieve indi®erence with the new steady state for the large and small response
cases respectively.
ij requires not only examining what happens to V s but rather to V s ¡
R °¤
0 °dG
Gij(°¤) since this will
take into account the expected e®ort cost contingent on becoming skilled.
19Since their chances of marrying a skilled person were not insigni¯cant, the increased seg-
regation does not have the e®ect of making them better o® by preserving 2 e®ective rounds in
which to obtain a better than average quality match.
29Table 7a
Increase in Segregation: Endogenous Responses{Large response














¢s = 0:0042 ¢u = 0:0033 ¢ = 0:0055
Table 7b
Increase in Segregation: Endogenous Responses{Small response














¢s = 0:0084 ¢u = ¡0:0058 ¢ = 0:0363
305.4. Robustness
We have checked the robustness of our results to various assumptions. For exam-
ple, instead of assuming that individuals from uu families are mildly constrained,
we have assumed that there are no borrowing constraints for any family types.
The results are very similar. As shown in our ¯rst exercise, the numbers obtained
are sensitive to the fertility distributionand to the degree of concavity of the ¡ij's.
Changes in the elasticity of substitution of labor types in the production function
a®ect the impact of a change in ¸ on the skill premium and hence on the income
distribution.
6. Conclusion
This paper presents a model of the intergenerational transmission of education
and marital sorting where parents matter both because of their household income
and because parental human capital determines the expected value of a child's
disutility from making an e®ort to become skilled. We show that an increase in
segregation has potentially ambiguous e®ects on the fraction of individuals that
become skilled in the steady state, and hence on marital sorting, the personal and
household income distribution, and welfare.
We calibrate the steady-state of our model to UK statistics and compare a
version of the model to the results obtained previously for the US. We ¯nd that
segregation is likely to have a smaller negative impact in the UK than in the
US as a result of the fertility and education transmission process. In the model
in which both sorting and education is endogenous, we ¯nd that an increase in
segregation will lead to a higher fraction of skilled individuals, a more compressed
income distribution, and higher welfare for skilled individuals. The e®ect on the
welfare of unskilled individuals depends on the size of the supply response. For
a large response, their utility increases; for a small response, unskilled individuals
are made worse o® despite the increase in their wage.
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